• Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Workshop: "Turkey and Israel in Syria — Path of Cooperation or Collision?"
  Speakers outline the interests and tools of both parties, as well as future scenarios

On Saturday, April 19, 2025, Al-Quds Center for Political Studies held a workshop titled “Turkey and Israel in Syria: Path of Cooperation or Collision?”. The event brought together a distinguished group of experts and researchers specializing in Turkish and Israeli affairs. Featured speakers included Dr. Samir Salha, Professor of Law and International Relations and Founding Dean of the Faculty of Law at Gaziantep University, and Professor Dr. Mahmoud Yazbak, a Palestinian historian and researcher. The discussion explored the dimensions of Turkish-Israeli relations in the Syrian context and the future of strategic balances in the region. Dialogue centered on the potential trajectories of bilateral relations, ranging from escalation and confrontation to power-sharing and cooperation, within a highly complex regional and international landscape.

At the beginning of the workshop, Mr. Oraib Al-Rantawi, Director General of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, welcomed the participants and emphasized the importance of exploring this topic, which has garnered increasing attention since December 8, 2024, particularly among academic and political circles within and outside of the region. Mr. Al-Rantawi explained that the central question being raised is whether we are witnessing a trajectory of de facto cooperation or open confrontation, either direct or indirect, between two countries with unique strategic positions. He described Turkey as a NATO member and Israel as a “state with a supra-Atlantic status,” highlighting the distinct strategic positions each country holds in the regional and international order.

Al-Rantawi pointed to several scenarios currently on the table for understanding the future trajectories of Syria amid Turkish-Israeli engagement. One such scenario is a "proxy war model," which mirrors dynamics seen during the decade of the Arab Spring. This scenario is evident in the tense relationship between Ankara and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as well as in the delicate balance in southern Syria. He mentioned another possible scenario, “cooperation and power-sharing,” which has appeared more plausible following the first round of talks in Baku. These talks recalled the coordination mechanism once reached between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2015. Lastly, Al-Rantawi noted that a direct confrontation scenario seems unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out, especially given the entangled interests and the multitude of actors involved in Syria.

To frame the discussion, he posed a series of guiding questions:

● What are Turkey’s interests in Syria, and what are its main concerns?
● What tools is it relying on to safeguard these interests?
● Conversely, what does Israel seek in Syria? Is it working to dismantle the Syrian state through an “alliance of minorities”?
● How is it seeking to protect its interests, particularly in light of its repeated targeting of Syrian military infrastructure?
● What is Syria’s position between these two regional poles?

Dr. Samir Salha stated that there is growing conviction within Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) that Turkey is prepared for a confrontation with Israel. This is not only due to developments in Syria, but also in light of several other regional issues. He argued that the more critical question in this context is whether tension with Israel serves Turkey’s domestic politics. He answered that previous indicators suggest it has indeed done so, with such tensions having been used multiple times to strengthen domestic political positions.

However, Salha emphasized that any escalation to the level of direct military confrontation between Turkey and Israel would serve no one’s interests. This type of scenario is unlikely due to the significant harm it would cause to both countries. He noted that the United States currently shows limited interest in Syria, focusing instead on Iran and America’s economy and trade. While this is the current U.S. focus, the administration may, in some instances, support a limited escalation to remind both countries that the cost of confrontation will be high. Nevertheless, an open conflict does not align with Washington’s interests, especially as it observes the waning influence of certain actors in Syria, notably Iran and Russia.

He affirmed that the United States still plays an important role, but it is moving forward with a new vision for repositioning itself in the Middle East. It will not allow for a significant clash between two allies, like Turkey and Israel. Such a conflict would jeopardize its strategic interests in the region. He also noted that both the Turkish and Israeli sides possess numerous tools for exerting mutual pressure. However, no mechanism for de-escalation or coordination between the two has yet emerged publicly.

In Dr. Mahmoud Yazbak’s remarks, he emphasized that what unfolded in Syria cannot be separated from Turkey’s early and systematic engagement with Syria and the broader region. He stated that Israel is fully aware that it is Ankara taking the lead in shaping the scene. From the very first moment Ahmad Al-Sharaa assumed power in Syria, Ankara wasted no time. Clear signs of a renewed Turkish-Syrian relationship quickly emerged, reflected in repeated visits by high-ranking Turkish officials to Damascus. Less than two months later, Al-Sharaa held an important meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In this meeting, they discussed a joint defense agreement that included the construction of an integrated air defense system, Turkish dominance over the formation of the new Syrian army, and the establishment of bases in central Syria.

The irony, as Yazbak pointed out, is that Israel was not the initiator in this context. Instead, Israel’s actions came as a reaction to Turkey’s moves. The planning originated on the Turkish side, while Tel Aviv found itself responding to developments beyond its control. As a result, Israel immediately took advantage of the post-Assad developments to reposition itself on the ground, violating the 1974 Disengagement Agreement by occupying areas east of the ceasefire line. Israel began to occupy Mount Hermon, the sources of the Yarmouk River, and the outskirts of Damascus. Under the pretext of protecting Druze villages, Israel started to implement plans to administratively annex these areas and provide employment opportunities to their residents within the occupied Golan Heights. Yazbak emphasized a central point in Israeli strategic thinking: the drive to “legitimize” and “normalize” its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, culminating in the Trump administration’s first-term recognition of Israeli sovereignty over this occupied territory.

He added that Turkey’s emergence as a key player, replacing Iran, after the fall of Assad, further heightened Israel’s concerns. The Turkish-Syrian defense agreement granted Turkey air mobility within Syria, the ability to train the nascent Syrian army, and permission to build military and air bases, even in parts of the Syrian desert. The agreement also allowed Turkish forces to deploy across all of Syria, including areas Israel considers part of its security buffer zone, which poses a direct challenge to Israeli interests.

Yazbak explained that Ankara views control over Damascus as a gateway to influencing both Iraq and Lebanon, while also strengthening its leverage over major powers. As a member of NATO, Turkey enjoys U.S. support within the broader context of Washington’s efforts to push Russia out of the Syrian arena. On the condition that the United States abandons its support for the Kurds, Erdoğan presents himself as a potential alternative to the American presence in Syria.

He stated that the increasing U.S. withdrawals from Syria have effectively amounted to abandoning its Kurdish allies. In addition, the recent agreement between the Kurds and the Syrian regime, backed by both Turkey and the United States, which called for integrating Kurdish forces into the Syrian army, has granted Ankara additional leverage and diminished Israel’s ability to use the Kurdish card as a pressure point.

According to Yazbak, this prompted Israel to launch intensive airstrikes on Syrian targets, focusing on military bases and air installations, in an attempt to prevent the emergence of a real threat along its borders. Despite these attacks, it appears that Israel is gradually coming to realize that it is losing its foothold in Syria, amid the growing Turkish role and the increasing complexity of the regional landscape.

In concluding his remarks, Dr. Yazbak pointed to statements made by the Turkish Foreign Minister affirming that Turkey does not seek a direct confrontation with Israel. However, he noted that developments on the ground indicate rising tensions between the two sides, particularly in light of the declining American role and the absence of a clear stance from President Donald Trump’s administration. The U.S. administration appears more focused on offering media support to Tel Aviv than providing concrete security guarantees on the ground.

At the end of the session, participants noted that Turkish-Israeli relations in Syria remain under examination and reassessment, especially in light of ongoing regional and international shifts. The outcome of the current negotiations with Iran could lead to two opposing scenarios: either a diplomatic agreement with Tehran or an escalation toward a military strike against it. Either scenario would have a significant impact on regional dynamics and would undoubtedly reshape strategic alignments across the region, further complicating relations among regional and international powers.