• During a brainstorming session organized by Al Quds Center for Political Studies Military Generals and experts discussed ground war scenarios and the potential for a larger regional conflict.
• Gradual ground invasions of the Gaza Strip following initial air operations will change the battlefield.
• The ground war is an existential necessity for Israel following the earthquake of October 7th, given that its objectives extend beyond the elimination of the resistance to encompass the suppression of the Palestinian question.
• Iran will not engage in the war, and Hezbollah would only do so if forced by Israel. The current Arab situation does not suggest a war extension, and Washington shows disinclination towards it.
• Israel might end the capacities of Hamas, but resistance is an ideology, a doctrine, and a project that will not end; rather, it would gain larger popularity and take on new forms.

Al Quds Center for Political Studies has organized a brainstorming session with the participation of high ranking retired officers from the Jordanian Armed Forces - the Arab Legion. The session focused on two main axes, the first one concerned the probabilities of Israel launching a vast ground war on the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip, the scenarios of such a war, the forms it would take, and its implications and limits. The second axis centered around the possibilities of the war extending from Gaza to a regional war, with the direct implication of Hezbollah and Iran on the battlefront. The participants included: General Mahmoud Idrisat, General Mohammed Ferghol, Brigadier General Abdelsalam Hararneh, General Doctor Engineer Hisham Khreisat, General Doctor Yassin Mawajdeh, General Doctor Salah Al Qudah, Brigadier General Mohammed Al Hbeis and Brigadier General Doctor Rakez Al Zaareer.

The ground war… An inevitable choice:
The participants were unanimous: Israel finds itself obligated to launch a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, given the deterioration of its deterrent force and the position of its army due to the extensive attack by Hamas on its forces around the strip and the settlements of the Gaza Envelope. They attributed this obligation to a series of factors:

● Israel has an existential need to restore its deterrent force and its status. This is especially true considering that this war initially occurred inside the Green Line, marking the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Typically, the territories of the Arab states served as the battlefield, providing Israel with an advantage that aligns with the interests of the international Western alliance led by the United States, which shows unconditional support for Israel.

● The announced and hidden objectives set by Israel for its war on Gaza and its response to the Al Aqsa Flood operation are not achievable through air strikes and distanced targeting. History has proven that it is impossible to win wars without controlling the land, for short or longer periods.

● The ending of the war after air strikes, no matter how destructive it was due to carpet bombing and the scorched-earth policy, without a deep land incursion into the strip, would, among other things, signify a victory for Hamas and the resistance in this conflict. At the very least, it would result in a situation of no victor, no vanquished, and this is the last thing Israel and its allies want.

Longer-term objectives of the war:
Participants further elaborated on the explicit and implicit objectives of the war. These objectives extend beyond restoring the deterrent force and the image of the unbeatable army, boosting morale and rebuilding trust between Israelis and their army and intelligence services, which have severely failed, no less than soldiers and military units have. The most prominent points of their interventions include:

● Israel did not hide its intention to liquidate Hamas, destroy its infrastructure and overthrow its authority and the ruling system it has implemented over the past couple of decades.

●Israel has additional objectives beyond the previous ones, specifically concerning the Gaza Strip and its 2.3 million inhabitants. There was near-unanimity on the matter of forcibly displacing Gazans to the Sinai under the pressure of destructive airstrikes and policies aimed at causing starvation and thirst. This includes cutting off water, power, food, and medicines, effectively transforming Gaza into an annexed security vital space.

● Although Israel is launching its most intense battle against Gaza, it also keeps an eye on the West Bank. Succeeding in removing a thorn from Gaza's side will provide a new impetus to its project of annexing the West Bank and 'Judaizing' it. This is part of a larger plan to suppress the Palestinian question by expelling it from within Palestinian territories, pushing it into Jordan and Egypt at the expense of their national security. This plan constitutes an existential threat to Jordan as a country, an entity, and an identity.

● The war is expected to last for an extended period, and its outcomes will be influenced by its implications. Israel's objectives in this war will be shaped by developments on the ground, the consequences, and the interventions. It is currently too early to provide detailed answers to the fundamental questions surrounding the war.

Scenarios of the war, its dimensions, and its repeated postponement:
The unanimity among the participants regarding the ground war scenario and the consensus on its necessity for Israel to achieve its objectives did not conceal the differences in their views. These differences involved estimating the paths and tactics that Israel would use for this war, as well as its limits and dimensions.

● This is not Israel’s war only, and Tel Aviv will not engage in the war alone. It is in close, or rather complete cooperation with the United States. This is why the scenarios and dimensions of the war may be affected by American calculations, which are broader than the Israeli calculations and the need of the Israeli army and political institutions for revenge and restoring balance.

● Israel has lost the element of surprise, but it retains the capacity to execute tactical and practical surprises. As a result, predicting a single scenario is difficult; nevertheless, it is certain that the war will involve all divisions of the Israeli military, including the air force, ground forces, and navy. Israel will employ a 'pincer movement' strategy, launching dual strikes on multiple fronts against the resistance, utilizing various tools and weapons.

● The war may take the form of a series of continuous, limited, and extensive operations, involving infiltrations into different areas followed by withdrawals, and subsequent repeated deeper infiltrations according to the 'salami-slicing tactics.' The objective is to confuse the resistance, exhaust its fighters, destroy its capabilities, collect intelligence, and subject the reserve units called upon for live-fire training, all in preparation for the impending major invasion. In this context, special units and elite units will play significant roles on the battlefield.

● In the process of mobile infiltration, Israel will appear determined to achieve certain objectives, including the killing or capture of resistance leaders, the liberation of hostages, or other goals falling within the context of 'psychological and media warfare.' As for tunnels, despite their importance and danger to the attacking party, 'modern warfare technology' will not render them an insurmountable obstacle to infiltration.

Regarding the Israeli hesitation to engage in the ground war and its repeated postponement, the participants have provided the following analyses:
● Israel is effectively diverting global attention with its ground war and its timing, thereby shifting focus away from its ongoing, intense air campaign on the Gaza Strip. This relentless aerial assault has turned the blockaded Gaza Strip into a zone of catastrophe.

● The high numbers of prisoners and detainees, whether they are Israeli soldiers or Israeli, Western, and foreign civilians held by Hamas and other resistance factions, pose an obstacle to an extensive ground invasion. The Israeli political class faces pressures from Israel's allies and supporters, who repeatedly advocate for postponement until this issue is resolved, either through negotiations or military action, with all the associated consequences. If left solely to Israel, the matter of prisoners and detainees would not be granted as much importance.

●Israel is intentionally launching unprecedented, intense airstrikes and employing the most modern anti-tunnel weapons, bombs, and missiles. This is done to alter the battlefield that the resistance has prepared, along with its defense network. Additionally, the aim is to undermine the morale of the Palestinian people and the resistance. As of now, the impact of the airstrikes on the underground networks and Hamas tunnels remains unknown.

●The divide between the political and military classes within Israeli decision-making institutions on one side, and between the United States and Israel on the other, will prolong the debate regarding the timing and dimensions of the ground war. Nevertheless, these differences will not prevent the ground war from happening.

●The shock of October 7th and the resistance's demonstrated capability for strategic deception, blinding, and diversion have left Israel unable to accurately assess the resistance’s capabilities. The fear of the unknown and the imperative to gather intelligence in cooperation with allies have significantly contributed to the delay of the ground war.

●The regular forces, which suffered the shock of October 7th, and the reserve forces, which were called up in the hundreds of thousands, need a time frame to regroup and boost their morale. Perhaps they need to undergo what can be termed 'fire leadership' training, to become capable of entering the ground war against Palestinian fighters who are more determined and resolute, well-trained, and deeply committed to their cause, possessing a 'martyrdom spirit' that is not found among Israeli soldiers.

The regional war… No one wants it
The second part of the brainstorming session centered on discussions concerning the potential escalation of the conflict against Gaza, the Palestinian people, and the resistance into a regional and larger-scale war. This escalation might be initiated by the participation of Iran-affiliated militias and factions on the battlefield, eventually involving Iran itself. Various opinions and scenarios were put forward, including:

● There was a near-unanimous consensus among participants that it is unlikely for Iran to directly engage in the war, as the the war on Gaza is not “Iran's war”, even though Iran is one of the most affected parties, either positively or negatively, depending on the developments on the ground and the direction the confrontation takes.

● The vast majority of participants considered it unlikely that Hezbollah engages directly in the war. However, one participant believed that Hezbollah might be compelled to do so in order to safeguard its image and credibility as a key player in the resistance axis. They emphasized that Hezbollah would not violate the rules of engagement established since 2006. Participants did not rule out the possibility of skirmishes and diversionary operations initiated by Iranian proxies in one area or another, which could potentially involve Palestinian and Lebanese factions, serving as a form of 'message-sending.

●In both cases, participants emphasized that American and Western threats would not be confined to mere verbal warnings. Washington assembled forces, fleets, aircraft carriers, and sent clear messages to any relevant parties in Tehran and Beirut. Additionally, there are potential promises made to parties as part of the carrot-and-stick strategy that Washington has frequently employed in its foreign policy implementation.

● Iran’s objective is to reinforce its dominance in Arab countries where it holds significant influence, while Hezbollah's goal is to control Lebanon and support the Syrian regime in Damascus. None of these parties wishes to risk these gains. There might be settlements and compromises in Lebanon and Syria, potentially leaving Hamas isolated on the battlefield, and perhaps even sacrificing Hamas for the sake of these agreements.

●Participants pointed out that Hamas did not engage in the 2006 war for Hezbollah, implying that Hezbollah will not feel obligated to engage in October 2023 alongside Hamas. This remark opens the door to discussions about the nature of the relationship between the two parties, the level of coordination between them, and the distance between 'dependency' and 'independence' in their decision-making. This matter will be explored in an upcoming research.

● Arab countries are not inclined to get involved in the confrontation more than what they did in the first two weeks of the war, which included condemnation, denunciation, appeals, and diplomatic efforts. The likelihood of a significant change in the official Arab stance sufficient to alter the situation is ruled out.

● Participants believe it's possible that Israel will initiate opening a battlefront in the North instead of Hezbollah. They may see the unprecedented international support as an opportunity to eliminate the Palestinian resistance in Gaza and Hezbollah in the North, framing it as self-defense. Based on this self-defense and fight-for-existence perspective, Hezbollah might become engaged in the war. Participants have not ruled out the possibility of Hezbollah engagement in the conflict if the developments on the ground suggest the elimination of the Palestinian resistance.

● Another crucial factor ruling out the possibility of a regional war erupting is that Washington does not desire it and may not be prepared for it. This aligns with Iran's desire to avoid an escalation into this scenario. There is an interest across the entire region, encompassing its states and governments, as well as some Western capitals, in preventing the outbreak of a regional war.

After the flood… How will the war end?
Discussions about "After the flood" and the scenarios surrounding the end of the war and what will come after it were not part of the planned agenda for the brainstorming session. However, the participants' interventions included ideas that can be discussed under this title, as follows:

● Participants estimated that, given the nature of its objectives and the context it emerged from after the October 7th earthquake, the war on Gaza will be prolonged and will not conclude like previous wars, reverting to the old situation. The change resulting from this war, while its characteristics are not yet clear, will be strategic and enduring, lasting for generations.

● Participants presented four scenarios for the end of the war: Hamas victory, Israeli victory, a no victor no vanquished situation, and the escalation into a regional war. They unanimously ruled out the last option due to various parties' desire to avoid it, especially Washington and Tehran, as well as the weakened Arab position that prevents the Arab states from seizing the opportunity provided by the resistance in Gaza to bring about a change in power dynamics and relationships.

● In the definitions of victory and defeat, one cannot use the same standards for both sides. Victory for Israel means crushing Hamas and the resistance, reoccupying the Gaza Strip, displacing its residents, or subjecting them to an alternative security and political system to replace Hamas's rule. As for victory for Hamas, it means resilience and inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy, preventing a scenario like "Beirut 1982," with leaders and fighters exiting to a third country, and preventing the displacement of Gazans.

● Participants distinguished between Israel's ability to eliminate the military and institutional assets of Hamas and the resistance on one hand, considering it a possibility that is not ruled out and favored by some, and eliminating Hamas and the resistance as ideas, projects, and ideologies, which will not extinguish as long as occupation and injustice persist. Hamas may lose its bases and presence in Gaza, but Palestinian resistance will gain the support and sympathy of the Palestinian people and Arab and Islamic nations.

●The no victor no vanquished scenario represents, from the participants' perspective, a victory for Hamas. Such a scenario may fit the "win-win" equation when it involves a conflict between states that are equal in terms of power and influence. However, in a war between a heavily armed state with one of the world's strongest armies, unconditionally supported by the United States and the West on one side, and resistance factions in besieged Gaza for two decades on the other side, the equation cannot be "win-win.

● Participants expressed their belief that Israel's victory in this war is more of a defeat for Arab countries than it is for Hamas. Others stated that it represents a setback for the "resistance and defiance" axis, delivering a severe blow to its slogans, narratives, credibility, and dignity. Some speakers pointed to an international-regional consensus on "eliminating Hamas," and that its presence in Gaza has entered its final stages.

● Participants reached several conclusions: Israel does not respect treaties or agreements, and the treaties it has signed do not guarantee the security or sovereignty of the countries that have signed them. They also emphasized that the lessons that can be drawn from Israel's decision to cut off water, energy, electricity, and medicine supplies to the people of Gaza, despite worldwide condemnation of these war crimes, should be incorporated into the strategic thinking of Arab countries that have established relations or treaties with Israel, including Jordan.

● The displacement of Gazans to Sinai, if it were to occur, would serve as a "test" for what could happen in the West Bank. It would revive the occupation's aspirations to displace its residents to Jordan. This poses a threat to existence that transcends security and stability, affecting the entity, the homeland, and the identity. It can be considered a declaration of war rather than just a breach of a treaty or crossing a red line.

● It is necessary to consider the massive wave of the Arab popular movement (Hirak) that supports resistance and reflect deeply on the impact that the gap between the stances of the governments and the Arab people can have on the future of the relationship between the states and their citizens, as well as on the stability of our Arab region.

● Participants discussed the "international context" of the war on Gaza, considering it as a preparation for the practical stages of the international confrontation regarding the nature and identity of the new world order. They highlighted three stages being prepared for what they described as the Third World War: the Ukrainian stage in the past, Gaza today, and Taiwan in the future. The preparation process may be simultaneous and parallel.