‘Ammar Wajih Saied (*)

Introduction
Irrespective of the position taken by Islamic Sharia jurisprudents towards democracy, it is logical that we should determine the existence of broad common areas between the Islamic programme and the democratic programme for change and reform. At the very least, the Islamists consider that democracy is one of the practical means of providing a free environment for reform, innovation and growth, all of which are considered to be basics of the Islamic political programme.

This is a programme that strives towards disciplined freedom and works to purify it of all that might lead to the possibility of an artificial clash between that freedom and the Islamic civilizational programme which opens onto the world, its culture, experience and accomplishments. That procedure is the key and the bridge for establishing a true link and living interaction between Islamic societies and the rest of human societies, starting with western societies.

The Democracy of the Conquest
Perhaps many of our brethren here and abroad were deceived at first sight that it was the American invasion that brought democracy to Iraq. It later became clear to them that in truth this was a pretext for the occupation.

The political class and most scholars realised early on during the days of despotism that change was necessary and that the government of Iraq must be consultative and allow a greater range of civil liberties to avoid the enterprises that brought the country to wars without any legitimate legal warrant and without consulting even the highest centres of decision-making. We were aware that we had paid the price with the lives of our children, and that our economy had deteriorated, and our culture been stunted. We created new enemies for ourselves, and the result was that we allowed our country to be occupied under various pretexts.

Accordingly, we realise that democracy as a concept was not dropped unexpectedly onto the culture of our people, rather they were lacking in the details and the practice.

When the word democracy entered along with the occupation, it arrived distorted. The occupation authority and their soldiers were the apparatus of democracy, and they committed crimes followed by more crimes with the excuse that they were fighting terrorism and trying to set up democracy, which became a dismissed and rejected term for many sections of the Iraqi people. The reactions of society can be divided according to three main entities, without wanting to generalise about all of the individuals in those constituent divisions. For example:

The Kurdish Community in Northern Iraq
The image which emerged of Sulaimaniya province after the occupation was as follows:

Despotism ended.

Fear, forced eviction and mass/chemical graves ended.

Wars against neighbouring states ended.

No US military presence damaging the province.

No destruction, killing or sabotage.

New Construction Projects.

Desire for federalism to be established and perhaps a Kurdish state.

The Result: Yes to Democracy.

The Shi’a Arab Society in Southern Iraq
Take for example the situation in Dhi Qar province:

Despotism, fear, forced evictions, mass games and wars with neighbouring states ended.

Non-malignant presence of British or European or Japanese military.

Limited destruction or sabotage.

Enormous oil and water resources.

No projects for constructions.

Desire to set up a Shi’a federalism or dominance over government under the umbrella of a religious authority.

The Result: Yes to the hope of democracy

The Sunni Arab Society in Central and Western Iraq:
The example of Anbar province:

Individualist despotism ended, and the emergence of collective despotism, along with terror and wars.

Presence of the US military is very damaging.

Destruction, killing, sabotage, arrests and the devastation of entire cities.

No projects for construction.

No religious authority driving democracy.

The Result: No, and a thousand times no to democracy by conquest.

The divisions we have mentioned do not mean that each of the sections has one united representation, for there are many Kurdish and Shi’a brethren who reject this type of democracy, just as not all Sunnis are the same [in opinion]. There are also different provinces such as Baghdad, Babel and Kirkuk, Mosul, Basra and Salah ad-Din.

One of the strange matters which was clearly conveyed in the midst of this obviously confused and varied stance on democracy was that 90% of the Kurdish and Shi’a provinces voted ‘yes’ to the constitution, and 90% of Sunnis rejected the constitution. This patently indicates the contradiction of conceptions between different sections of the people, and to the sectarian nature of that constitution.

The Iraqi Islamic Party and Democracy:
The Islamic Party was set apart by its political view which differed in many particulars from the opinions of the majority of the other parties. At a time when the Shi’a Religious Authority could bring together all of the political groupings under one umbrella, Sayyid as-Sistani did not appear on the television screen explaining himself so not to be attributed with certain statements. Instead it was enough for statements to be published from his office and it was considered obligatory to follow them. Much of the time the Authority [Sistani] contented itself with remaining silent about the violence that was being perpetrated by the Americans towards Iraqis on the basis that a statement against it might damage the course of democracy which contained two phases of elections and the writing of the permanent constitution. When some of the Shi’a objected to what was going on, matters were diplomatically juggled. In cases where the Kurdish parties ruled in the northern provinces and possessed the apparatus of power and the complete range of media, it was not difficult for them to convince the people of the necessity for a prompt progression towards the invaders’ democracy because it was a valuable opportunity which might not reoccur.

As for the view of the Iraqi Islamic Party, it was more balanced because we interpreted the political scene from all angles. We have brought together the following considerations in order to build our political project in the best way.

1)   We do not have historical fears or hang-ups and we believe that only what is correct is borne out. We have complete faith in the fundamental rules (he who hastens something through before its time is punished by having it revoked). Therefore we have avoided the unstudied rush, and we have lingered in order to achieve our goals in the right way.

2)   We believe that the American army and those with them brought into Iraq the conquest of the occupiers – not of the liberators – and we have stated this since day one. They have long-term strategic projects in front of them in the region. Accordingly, the option of resistance remains a principle and inescapable one. We realised from the beginning that resistance was an option which could be formed in an organised and automatic fashion because it was a legitimate, legal, natural and nationalist option. As for the political option, that required experience and skill and considerable time to build institutions.

So we emphasised the political option that was being ignored, and we launched ourselves as a political nationalist project in order to bring together the disparate people. When we had decided on that we tolerated the thousands of arrows shot by our brothers and friends who accused us of lackeyism and of transgressing the Sharia and other things. Our martyrs are no fewer and no less distinguished than the martyrs of the Valiant Resistance, but in our case we were fully aware of what we were doing.

3)   At the same time we believed in the right of the resistance and we respected it, and equally we did not object to any of the groups. We were and still are balanced on the necessity of relying on both options together. We had to look after the public who had nothing but this option to uphold them, particularly since some of the Islamic religious authorities were always confirming the uselessness of the political process in the shade of the occupation forces although they did not specify any other political process without them.

Hence our stance was precise in order that we should not lose our public, not only for the sake of the elections but also so that this public should not lose itself and convert to another convoy.

One day I met one of the members of the negotiations with the Americans during the days of the first battle of Fallujah when he recounted with distress his fear that the people of Fallujah would turn to selling cigarettes on the pavements at a time when the people of many of the other provinces were getting ahead of them. So we did not want to disassociate our people from the importance of paying attention to the future of their children, in order that welfare might be spread to all of the people of the nation. At the same time, we are not inattentive to the sacrifice of money and blood for the sake of the nation.

4)   We also realised that the liberation of the nation cannot be achieved by one faction of the people alone, and Jihad cannot be limited to the Sunni people because Iraq is a country for everyone. Our entry into the political process serves greatly in approximating points of view, and gives others the idea that it is possible to adopt both options at the same time. We calculated matters carefully and throughout the period of the occupation there will be channels for all of the people since everyone has a national entitlement to participate in ejecting the occupier.

The Challenges Facing Us
1)      Marginalisation planned by the Americans and political groups.

2)      Harm done to us from an early stage and the waging of a media war against us.

3)      Scarcity of material means.

4)      Imposition of sectarian quotas which served neither us nor the people.

5)      Lack of realisation by our people of what we were doing and equally the negativity of some of the Islamic religious authorities towards us.

6)      The waging of consecutive military campaigns on our areas.

7)      Attacking our impoverished media communication networks.

8)      The emaciated efforts made by members of our party in the face of all these challenges.

9)      The entry of nationalist partners with us into the Front called for time to reach political maturity.

10)  The attack against us by even the national media and some of the nationalist forces who did not comprehend our project.

The Opportunities Granted to Us
1)      The Iraqi Islamic party is a deep rooted entity, founded in 1960, and containing leaders with experience.

2)      The brethren who worked in the diasporas set up relations with political groups and had vision through the periods of repression and the travel bans implemented in our country.

3)      The broad popular base for the party. We have 27 branches and 435 divisions.

4)      Our clear stance on the Occupation.

5)      Our supportive or neutral stance towards the resistance.

6)      Our rejection of terrorism.

7)      Our clear stance on national unity and our scepticism towards sectarian federal provinces.

8)      Our rejection of the constitution and our agreement to it being passed on the condition that it is reformed and amended.

9)      Our realism in dealing with daily problems and putting forward practical solutions and not sufficing with merely rejecting and condemning.

10)  Our support to the oppressed and our stance towards the battles of Fallujah and Najaf, and the establishment of demonstrations and strikes in front of Abu Ghraib prison and the Ministry of Defence, and our defence of thousands of detainees and securing the release of hundreds of them.

The Required Regional and Islamic Arab Role in Making a Success of the Democratic Experience in Iraq
1)      The necessity of maintaining complete contact with all Iraqis by means of visits, communications and exchanging information.

2)      A supportive media stance to the nationalist political project in addition to support of the option of the rightly guided nationalist resistance.

3)      Rejection of terrorism in all its forms whether this comes from militias, or from the state, or from the occupation forces, without favouring one faction above another.

4)      Expending real efforts for national reconciliation with the effective pursuit of procedures to this end.

5)      Increasing visits to neighbouring states and convincing them of all of the means of inhibiting damaging interference into the internal affairs of Iraq.

6)      Opening up the field for Iraq’s young people to train and develop within Arab and Islamic lands in order that they may revive civil society’s organisations and governmental institutions.

7)      Offering real material support to all nationalist projects whose sincerity and effectiveness has been determined in patching up the rift and achieving human and economic growth for Iraq.

8)      Fearlessly making the Arab and Islamic people aware of all that is going on in Iraq because we believe that the Iraq experience is perhaps one of the most serious that the Arab world has gone through; every disaster has been less serious than Palestine and Iraq. 

9)      Activating all economic, cultural, humanitarian and development projects in the Arab and Islamic nation with swift steps and concentrated efforts in order to unite the ranks and to create a force to stand up to all plots targeting the Arab and Islamic world.

10)  A concerted effort to lessen the gulf between the Islamic and nationalist trends in the Arab world and to offer energy for construction and growth and to stand up against the conspiracies that would be devastating.

Lastly I say, as Shaikh al-Nablesi said:
‘I was eaten the day the white bull was eaten’ [i.e: ‘united we stand, divided we fall’], and happy is he who learns his lesson from others.

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 (*)  Member of the Political Office for the Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraq.